From Sky News, with additional reporting from The Guardian here, for background. Not much here that hadn’t been vaguely feared before, but it’s about time we heard from the fighters on the front lines exactly what is going on. To that end, I’ll paste in the entire emails (or everything Sky posted, anyway) to avoid editorializing; my thoughts are not the story this time.

British troops in Helmand province

The Leaked Emails
Saturday September 23, 2006

A series of leaked emails has revealed more of the concerns within the armed forces about the continuing fighting against Taliban guerrillas in Afghanistan.

The middle-ranking officer with 3 Para who wrote them is serving in the dangerous southern Helmand province.

His three emails – excerts of which are printed below – give a vivid description of the fierce fighting UK troops are involved in, the bravery of those involved – and his concerns about numbers of personnel and equipment.

KEY POINTS:

:: We are lacking manpower
:: Desperately in need of more helicopters
:: Shooting by some Harrier pilots supporting ground troops is inaccurate
:: Some soldiers look very frightened and slow to react
:: All arms and services must be fit and capable of basic weapon skills and fieldcraft.

This is what the officer wrote:

THE EMAILS:

First email:

I have a Coy Gp here although we are lacking manpower. Desperately in need of more helicopters.

Attacks consist of regular rocket, mortar, RPG and small arms on the fire base, plus fairly heavy fire fights out on the ground.

The Toms are getting to grips with their core business of mouse hole charges, barmines and grenades for buildings, and all direct fire weapons for the assault.

The RAF have been utterly utterly useless. In contrast USAF have been fantastic.

I have a couple of soldiers who I have concerns about after some heavy contact … Even now with our own artillery firing they look very frightened and slow to react.

There is a fine line between giving them time to accept what has happened and adjust, and gripping them hard and forcing them to focus.

Second email:

(In this email, the officer praises the bravery of Corporal Bryan Budd, who was killed in action on August 20 and describes the battle in which he died.)

Budd saw the enemy 25 metres in front behind a bush line, and using hand signals organised his section to attack.

As he went forward the landrover on the left was ambushed, despite this he led his section forward with heavy fire personally accounting for at least 2 enemy.

Sadly he and 3 of his section were hit although one was only in the body armour. As the section pulled back in the face of heavy fire, no-one saw Budd was down.
Taliban fighters increasing their resistance The other 2 casualties were pulled back, and shortly afterwards Budd was declared MIA. The pl comd and 3rd section had made their way forward, and tried to advance forward to find Budd but they were driven back under heavy fire.

The platoon radio op took a round in the chest but was saved by the body armour. The platoon commander received some shrapnel in his backside but continued.

The CSM made another trip out and back on the Quad bike to collect the third casualty, this time coming under fire himself but continuing nonetheless.

By now they could see the Taliban were rushing weapons out of a mosque hidden in depth. We began to engage them with mortars.

At about the same time the enemy engaged us with mortars, and were clearly getting the base plate bedded in as their rounds began to creep closer.

It was around an hour since he (Cpl Budd) had been hit, and initially had no pulse. He was given CPR and moved as quickly as possible.

The CSM raced out on the Quad bike and retrieved him, but the doctor was unable to save him.

The 2 platoons were trickling towards us now clearly exhausted, and if there ever needed to be a justification for the 2 miler this was it.

Those of us on the fire support tower were shouting at them to keep running and spread out because of the enemy mortar fire. They were all exhausted and scared, but I think the physicality of it was a real eye opener.

The contact on 20 Aug proves once again the old lesson, that all arms and services must be fit and capable of basic weapon skills and fieldcraft.

There were many people on that day who will go unrecognised, but simply volunteered immediately to go out as part of the reinforcements regardless of rank or experience.

Third email:

Ref emotion there has been plenty of tears which as you know is all rather humbling.

I have followed the same line as far as keeping them together, and injecting humour where possible.

As for facts I have been in the field since July 27th and have only had 3 days with no contact so fairly constant.

(Referring to attack helicopters) The bottom line is that there are not enough of them.

(Then, referring to air support during a fight with the Taliban) Harrier couldn’t identify and fired rockets that just missed Coy HQ compound.

Pl Comd decided to continue to move, but as the enemy closed up he put in a snap ambush and slowed them up with a heavy rate of fire.

Thankfully no casualties, lots of ammo expended!