Freedom, 2006

Liberated in the name of the people from Gawker, and just in time for the election.

America: a gentle reminder for voting day

Oi! Don't elect any more idiots!

from the Sydney Morning Herald via Pharyngula

Operation Global Media Domination: ATTENTION READERS!!!

Michael J. Fox, foxWhichever one of you came here through a search for “why michael j. fox pleasures his fans,” you need to talk to me, baby.

What did you hear, when did you hear it, who has he pleasured, and, most importantly, how is he?

< tastelessness > some of us have been looking for a way to combine the perfect man and the perfect vibrator for a very long time < / endtastelessness >

pic o’ the day: Borat on the cover of Vanity Fair

This one’s a real eye-ripper, straight from the folks at Fishbowl NY. Blame them, although I think the titles are straight outta CondeNasty.

Borat on VF. Is good, yes? What means, 'Aieeeee, my eyes, my eyes?'

they knew: Iraqi quagmire predicted in 1999

Rumsfeld; we don't need not stinking proof!It wasn’t just Colin Powell, a voice Cassandrizing itself into marginalization and eventual unemployment; even the military’s own war games predicted the current state of affairs.

More to the point, it showed that only a force nearly three times the size of the current one could have any chance at maintaining stability and preventing sectarian chaos.

George Washington University’s National Security Archive applied through a Freedom of Information Act request, and obtained the documents that prove it. AP has the report.

A series of secret U.S. war games in 1999 showed that an invasion and post-war administration of Iraq would require 400,000 troops, nearly three times the number there now.

And even then, the games showed, the country still had a chance of dissolving into chaos…

“The conventional wisdom is the U.S. mistake in Iraq was not enough troops,” said Thomas Blanton, the archive’s director. “But the Desert Crossing war game in 1999 suggests we would have ended up with a failed state even with 400,000 troops on the ground…”

Some of the conclusions are similar to what actually occurred after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003:

  • “A change in regimes does not guarantee stability,” the 1999 seminar briefings said. “A number of factors including aggressive neighbors, fragmentation along religious and/or ethnic lines, and chaos created by rival forces bidding for power could adversely affect regional stability.”
  • “Even when civil order is restored and borders are secured, the replacement regime could be problematic — especially if perceived as weak, a puppet, or out-of-step with prevailing regional governments.”
  • “Iran’s anti-Americanism could be enflamed by a U.S.-led intervention in Iraq,” the briefings read. “The influx of U.S. and other western forces into Iraq would exacerbate worries in Tehran, as would the installation of a pro-western government in Baghdad.”
  • “The debate on post-Saddam Iraq also reveals the paucity of information about the potential and capabilities of the external Iraqi opposition groups. The lack of intelligence concerning their roles hampers U.S. policy development.”
  • “Also, some participants believe that no Arab government will welcome the kind of lengthy U.S. presence that would be required to install and sustain a democratic government.”
  • “A long-term, large-scale military intervention may be at odds with many coalition partners.”